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Ten dollars today is more attractive than the 
same amount of money tomorrow and is 
consistent with the well known proverb, “a 
bird in the hand is worth two in the bush.” 
We all know that the value of a reward is 
discounted over time. How the value dis-
counts over time and what is the rationale 
for such discounting, however, is less clear. 
Classical economic theory has assumed an 
exponential form of discounting which 
has been repeatedly shown insufficient 
for explaining the data(Frederick and 
Loewenstein, 2002). Hyperbolic discount-
ing, with a faster discount rate in the begin-
ning than in the distant future, is found to fit 
the data better empirically. Consequently, it 
is of great interest to understand why people 
and other animals discount future rewards 
hyperbolically.
In the past, a number of explanations 
have been offered. Not surprisingly these 
explanations can be categorized into either 
value-based models or time-based models. 
In  value-based models, hyperbolic dis-
counting emerges when discount rates 
are assumed to be stochastic (Farmer and 
Geanakoplos, 2009), or there is uncer-
tainty of the risk that the future reward 
will not be realized (Sozou, 1998), or there 
is uncertainty of the timing of the reali-
zation (Dasgupta and Maskin, 2005). In 
time-based models, hyperbolic discounting 
can be shown to result from the percep-
tual distortion of time (Takahashi, 2005; 
Kim and Zauberman, 2009). Recently, 
Ray and Bossaerts (2011) offered another 
time-based explanation beginning with 
the crucial observation that subjective or 
psychological time is different from objec-
tive or physical time. They argued that the 
discounting function is indeed exponential 
with respect to the subject’s internal clock, 
but it appears to be hyperbolic to observers 
who use objective time – the measurement 
of which isn’t dependent upon biologi-
cal systems and their inherent variability. 
Specifically, they made three assumptions:
1 Increment of psychological time is 
stochastic and auto-correlated (i.e., 
the internal clock is positive quadrant 
dependent).
2 Increment of psychological time is 
stationary.
3  Value discounting over psychological 
time is exponential.
Ray and Bossaerts performed both analyti-
cal proof and numeric simulation. When 
the auto-correlation of psychological time 
increments is reduced to 0, the discounting 
function becomes the classical exponential 
form; when the auto-correlation is non zero 
(e.g., 0.3), the discounting function becomes 
hyperbolic. Thus, hyperbolic discounting 
naturally emerges when psychological time 
advances in a self-correlated way – i.e., if the 
current increment is large, it’s likely that the 
next increment is also large.
This explanation is quite interesting 
and unlike other subjective time-based 
models (e.g., Takahashi, 2005; Kim and 
Zauberman, 2009) in which psychologi-
cal time is a concave function of physical 
time, the psychological time in this model 
is actually synchronized with the physi-
cal time on average. This is an important 
property because experiments have shown 
that while we have uncertainty in estimat-
ing time intervals, the average of our esti-
mates is actually quite accurate (Church 
et al., 1994; Rakitin et al., 1998; Buhusi and 
Meck, 2005).
On the other hand, the representation of 
psychological time in this model does not 
follow the scalar property (or Weber’s law) 
of timing and time perception, which has 
been demonstrated in numerous studies – 
including those involving optimal foraging 
(see Gibbon et al., 1984, 1997; Bateson, 2003 
for reviews). The scalar property of interval 
timing means that the coefficient of varia-
tion of time estimates is a constant, thereby 
producing timescale invariance (Gibbon, 
1977). Based on numeric   simulation, the 
coefficient of variation in the Ray and 
Bossaerts (2011) model is decreasing over 
time.
Here we demonstrate that hyperbolic 
discounting can be shown to result from 
the scalar property of time perception 
alone, without the assumption of internal 
exponential discounting over time. In a nut-
shell, Weber’s law states that the incremental 
amount of change required for a stimulus 
to be perceptually differentiated or notice-
able is proportional to the current stimulus 
magnitude. Time perception is well known 
to abide by Weber’s law across a wide range 
of durations (Buhusi and Meck, 2005; 
Grondin, 2010 – but see Lewis and Miall, 
2009). We reason that if the change in dura-
tion is not noticeable, then the change of 
the corresponding reward value should not 
be noticeable either. Otherwise people can 
detect the difference of time based on the 
difference of value.
Let’s assume that both the percep-
tion of value and time follow Weber’s law 
with Weber fractions a and b, respectively. 
Imagine that a subject perceives the value of 
reward is V at time t. As time advances, the 
perceived value decreases. Consider a delay 
τ in time where the subject just perceives a 
noticeable change in time. With the scalar 
property of time perception, we have
τ=bt
The delay also causes the perceived value 
to decrease. As the delay τ is a barely notice-
able change, the change of value V, denoted 
as ∆, should also be barely noticeable (see 
Figure 1). That is:
∆τ =− += Vt Vt aV t () () ()
Combining the two equations together 
we get:
Vt Vt bt aV t () ()() −+ =
We want to find an explicit form of 
V(t) satisfying the above condition. One 
 solution  is:
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This discounting function is hyper-
bolic, as the discount rate, |dV/dt/V|, is a 
decreasing function of t. This model has two 
advantages: (1) the free parameters, a and 
b, have psychological meaning and can be 
independently measured – see Meck, 2006; 
(2) the model does not assume any form 
of discounting to start with. However, it 
should be emphasized that the assump-
tions made in this model, i.e., Weber’s law 
in time and value perception, are only valid 
within certain time ranges. Particularly, in 
the sub-second range, time perception typi-
cally does not always follow Weber’s law so 
clearly (see Gibbon, 1977; Grondin, 2010).
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FIgure 1 | A “just noticeable” change in time will result in a “just noticeable” change in the 
corresponding value.
Cui  Scalar timing explains hyperbolic discounting
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